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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently assigned this case
to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4), by order
dated May 6, 2009. The Utah Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction of this case pursuant
to the Utah Supreme Court's assignment and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
However, this Court only has jurisdiction to review the trial court's granting of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the
trial court's denial of Plaintiff s three post-judgment motions due to Plaitniffs' failure to
file an amended notice of appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2). This Court denied
Defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition and deferred ruling on such motion
"pending full briefing and plenary presentation and consideration of the case." This
Court should now address the jurisdictional issue raised in Defendant's Motion for
Summary Disposition.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court err in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment?
a. Standard of Review: Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for review
l

conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial
court, but review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944
P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Did Plaintiffs' failure to file an amended notice of appeal pursuant to Rule
4(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure prevent this Court from
exercising jurisdiction over denial of Plaintiffs' three post-judgment motions?
a. Standard of Review: "The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question
of law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness. Brown v. Glover, 2000
UT 89,U 15, 16P.3d540.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion to alter or
amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?
a. Standard of Review: "'A motion or action to modify a final judgment is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which must be
based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances.' That
court's determination will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of
discretion." Gillmorv. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) (quoting
Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)).
Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' motion to conform the pleadings
to the evidence pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?

2

a. Standard of Review: Rule 15(b) allows for mandatory and permissive
amendment of pleadings. Under the mandatory prong, the trial court must
allow a party to amend a pleading if the parties tried an extraneous issue by
express or implied consent. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Braham Fin., Inc., 1999
UT 13,18, 974 P.2d 288. "A court's conclusion that parties tried an issue
by express or implied consent is a legal question, which [this Court]
reviewfs] for correctness." Id. "However, 'because the trial court's
determination of whether the issues were tried with all parties' implied
consent is highly fact intensive, [this Court] grant[s] the trial court a fairly
broad measure of discretion in making that determination under a given set
of facts." Id. "Under the permissive prong of the Rule 15(b) analysis, [this
Court] will reverse the trial court's denial of a motion to amend only where
there is 'no reasonable basis' for its decision." Eldridge v. Farnsworth,
2007 UT App 243, ^ 40, 166 P.3d 169 (quoting England v. Horbach, 944
P.2d 340, 345 (Utah 1997)).
V.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion for leave
to amend their complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?
a. Standard of Review: This Court can overturn a trial court's denial of a
motion to amend a complaint only where the trial court has abused its
discretion. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, f 14, 87
P.3d 734.
3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND
REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) (2001)
(9)(b) For new policies written on or after January J, 2001,
the limits of underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to
the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability
coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage
limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor
vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a
lesser amount by signing an acknowledgement form provided
by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured
motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to
purchase underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal
to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle
liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2)
A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of
judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any
motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice
of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying
judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal
or an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, if the pleadings is one to which no responsive
pleadings in permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time
4

within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires....
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days
after entry of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arises out of Plaintiffs' claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits
above the amounts set forth in their auto insurance policy. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant failed to provide them with sufficient underinsured motorist coverage and
have raised claims for breach of contract, insurance bad faith, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on that alleged

5

failure. Based on the allegations and claims articulated in their Complaint, the trial court
granted Defendant summary judgment and subsequently denied Plaintiffs' three postjudgment motions. Plaintiffs now appeal the trial court's rulings.
Facts
Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident on or about March 18, 2006,
in which they allegedly received injuries which exceeded the at-fault party's liability
insurance limits. (R. at 3, ^[ 9.) When they made a claim for underinsured motorist
benefits with Defendant, Plaintiffs were notified that they had UIM coverage of
$10,000/$20,000. (R. at 4, % 12; 411.) Dissatisfied, Plaintiffs filed suit against
Defendant. (R. at 1.) Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges, in pertinent part, that Defendant
failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b) (R. at 2, Tf 9) and that
Defendant violated "Utah law," claiming that Defendant should have paid them UIM
benefits in an amount in excess of the limits than stated in their insurance policy and
more than that purchased by the premiums paid. (R. at 4-5.)
Procedural Details of the Case
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant on or about October 18, 2006.
(R. at 1-18.) After the end of fact discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not prevail on their claims as stated in their
Complaint. (R. at 419-20.) After briefing by both parties and oral arguments, the trial
court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in a Memorandum Decision
dated January 9, 2009. (R. at 715-22.) The Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment was entered on or about February 11, 2009. (R. at 800-03.) Plaintiffs then
6

filed three post-judgment motions under Rules 59(e), 15(b), and 15(a), seeking
amendment of the Judgment, an order conforming the pleadings to the evidence, and
leave to amend their Complaint, respectively. (R. at 765-68.) After briefing by both
parties and oral arguments, the trial court denied each of the three post-judgment
motions. (R. at 846-51.) Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 30,2009 (R. at
858-60), before the trial court entered the Order denying the three post-judgment motions
on May 8, 2009 (R. at 865-68.) Subsequently, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Disposition, claiming that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The parties are now in the process of finishing briefing on
Plaintiffs' appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I
Defendant moved for summary judgment because undisputed facts failed to
support the claims identified in Plaintiffs5 Complaint. (R. at 356-420.) A review of the
Complaint reveals that Plaintiffs based all four of their causes of action on two
allegations: (a) Defendant violated Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b); and (b)
Defendant violated "Utah law." (R. at 2, 4-5.) In their Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs conceded that Defendant had not violated Utah
Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). (R. at 434, 720.) This left the trial court with only one
remaining issue—whether Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendant violated "Utah law" was
sufficient to provide notice to Defendant of the basis for their claims. Appropriately, the
trial court ruled that Plaintiffs' Complaint did not provide sufficient notice to Defendant
7

of the basis for their claims, even under Utah's liberal pleading standard. (R. at 721.)
The trial court relied on this Court's ruling in Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch.,
2008 UT App 315, 193 P.3d 650, for support of its conclusion that Plaintiffs had failed to
provide the requisite minimum notice. (R. at 720.) The trial court correctly granted
Defendant summary judgment based on the evidence and the claims identified in
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
II
Plaintiffs failed to preserve their appeal of the trial court's denial of their three
post-judgment motions, preventing this Court from exercising jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
filed their notice of appeal in this case after entry of the Order granting Defendant
summary judgment, but before the trial court entered an order disposing of Plaintiffs'
three post-judgment motions. Under Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal was valid as it pertained to review of the
underlying grant of summary judgment. However, this Rule also requires Plaintiffs to
file an amended notice of appeal if they wanted to preserve their appeal of the trial
court's denial of their three post-judgment motions. Plaintiffs failed to file an amended
notice of appeal, thereby preventing this Court from exercising jurisdiction over these
post-judgment motions.

in
The trial court is given broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion
to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
this case, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the
8

Judgment for several reasons. First, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs were attempting to
raise a new argument which had not been previously mentioned in their Complaint. (R.
at 866.) Second, Plaintiffs failed to distinguish the Asael case or otherwise show its
inapplicability to the present case. (Id.) Third, Plaintiffs' new argument was directly
contrary to the argument made in their Complaint, i.e. that Plaintiffs had a "new" policy
requiring Defendant to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). (Id.) Fourth,
Plaintiffs had not even made an attempt, prior to the grant of summary judgment, to seek
leave to amend their Complaint to include their new argument. (R. at 867.) Fifth,
Plaintiffs were attempting to contravene the trial court's case management order by
attempting to raise new claims after all discovery deadlines had passed, and after they
realized that their claims failed as a matter of law. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs raised a new
argument in their Rule 59(e) motion that they had not made during the summary
judgment proceeding, specifically claiming that they had made an error in citing to the
wrong statute in their Complaint. Based on these reasons, the trial court correctly denied
Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.
IV
This Court should uphold the denial of Plaintiffs' claim for relief under Rule 15(b)
for several reasons. First, the relatively recent decisions of Utah's appellate courts
support the conclusion that Rule 15(b) does not even apply in a summary judgment
setting. Second, the trial court properly denied Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion to conform
the pleadings to the evidence because such relief could be granted only if the trial court
allowed alteration or amendment of the judgment under Rule 59(e), which it did not do.
9

Additionally, Plaintiffs provided no factual or legal support for their claim for relief
under Rule 15(b). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b)
motion.

V
As with Rule 15(b), the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in
denying Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) motion for leave to amend their complaint. First, because
the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend, the trial court could not even
consider granting this motion for leave to amend. Second, Plaintiffs' motion for leave
was untimely. Third, Plaintiffs failed to establish entitlement to relief under Rule 15(a)
due to their failure to meet the criteria required for such relief. Therefore, the trial court
properly exercised its broad discretion in denying Plaintiffs Rule 15(a) motion.
ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for
review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial court, but
review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1997). Based on this standard of review, this Court should conclude that the trial
court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
A.

The Trial Court Correctly Granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment based on the allegations in
Plaintiffs' Complaint and the undisputed facts. Specifically, Defendant argued that
Plaintiffs failed, as a matter of law, to establish their four causes of action for breach of
contract, insurance bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. (R. at 360.) Each of these four causes of action rests
solely on the following allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint:
4.

On March 18, 2006, plaintiffs were insured by
defendant under an automobile insurance policy which
was issued by defendant after January 1, 2001.

6.

Pursuant to § 31A-22-305(9)(b)9 Utah Code
Annotated, the limits of underinsured motorist
coverage required to be provided to plaintiffs was an
amount equal to the lesser of the limits of their liability
coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the
insured's automobile insurance policy, unless the
insured purchased coverage in a lesser amount by
signing an acknowledgement form meeting the certain
statutory requirements.

7.

This provision was considered part of the plaintiffs'
insurance policy.

12.

In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts,
defendant advised Plaintiffs that their policy of
insurance only provided underinsured motorist

n

coverage in the amount of $10,000, up to $20,000, per
occurrence.

15.

16.

The defendant has refused to pay the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage required by the policy
and by law.
The defendant's refusal to pay the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage required by the policy
and by law constitutes a breach of the parties' contract
of insurance..

(R. at 2, 4-5 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs based each of their four causes of action on
two arguments: (a) Defendant failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9)(b); and (b) Defendant violated "Utah law." Given the clear and unequivocal
language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b), the trial court acknowledged that this
statute only applied to "new policies written on or after January 1, 2001." (R. at 720
(emphasis added).) However, Plaintiffs had been insured with Defendant since 1966. (R.
at 357, Tf 3; Appellant's Br. at 9.)
In addressing these two issues, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs had conceded in
their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment "that their policy
would likely be considered as an existing policy, rather than a new policy...." (R. at
434, 720.) In light of Plaintiffs' admission that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) did
not apply to their claim as alleged in their Complaint, the trial court was left only to
determine whether Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendant had violated "Utah law" satisfied
Utah's notice pleading standard, warranting denial of summary judgment.
In addressing this last issue, Plaintiffs raised for the first time their argument that
Defendant had violated a different part of the UIM statute, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 31A12

22-305(9)(g), which applies only to "existing" policies.1 (R. at 443-48.) Plaintiffs
argued that the reference in their Complaint that Defendant had violated "Utah law"
complied with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(e)(1) in that it was "simple, concise
and direct," and that such allegation should be liberally construed as required by Rule
1(a), purportedly allowing them to raise this new argument related to subsection "g." (R.
at 444.) In response to this new argument, which Plaintiffs raised for the first time in
their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs'
"existing" policy, Defendant refused to consider, let alone argue, the merits of such a new
claim, and urged the trial court to do the same. (Ex. " 1 , " at 2-8.)
It is well settled that "a plaintiff is required, under [Utah's] liberal pleading
standard of notice pleading, to submit a 'short and plain statement... showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and 'a demand for judgment for the relief.'" Canfield v.
Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 14, 122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(l)-(2)). In addition, "[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair notice of
the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved.'" Id. (citation omitted). However, "it must do at least that much''
AsaelFarr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315, f 17, 193 P.3d 650
(emphasis added) (citing Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App 165, f 13, 185 P.3d 573). Here,
Plaintiffs have not done "at least that much."

1

Although Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment refers to their new claim as
arising under Subsection "h," this particular subsection was renumbered from its original designation as subsection
"g." Therefore, for the purpose of continuity, Appellee's Brief will use the subsection "g" designation to refer to the
part of the statute which applies to "existing" policies.
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In this case, this Court must answer one central question: Is there any allegation in
Plaintiffs' Complaint that could possibly lead the trial court, or any reasonable person for
that matter, to conclude that Plaintiffs intended to argue or claim that they had an
"existing" policy and that Defendant failed to comply with any statutory requirements
related to such an existing policy? The answer is "no." In fact, Plaintiffs' Complaint not
only cited subsection (b) only, not (g), but it also contained a two substantive claims that
were pertinent only under subsection (b). Those allegations were that Plaintiffs' policy
was issued by Defendant after January 1, 2001 (R. at 2, ^f 4) and that Plaintiffs never
signed a UIM acknowledgement form (R. at 3, ^J 8). Subsection (g) did not require
existing insureds to sign an acknowledgement form. Simply alleging that a party has
violated "Utah law" does not provide the minimum notice requirements spoken of by the
Canfield and Asael courts. Thus, by definition, Plaintiffs have not complied with Utah's
pleading standard sufficient to provide notice to Defendant of the nature and basis of their
new claim. The trial court agreed with the reasoning in Asael in granting Defendant
summary judgment. (R. at 720.)
Despite the clear lack of notice, Plaintiffs insist that a simple reference to "Utah
law" satisfies Utah's liberal pleading standard. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that if they
had "left out the statutory reference in paragraph 6 of their complaint entirely (the only
reference to subsection (b)), their complaint would still have stated a claim against
[Defendant]." (Appellants' Br. at 29-30.) Plaintiffs also state that their Complaint would
have provided sufficient notice even if the statutory reference to subsection "b" and the
reference to when the policy began had been omitted. (Appellants' Br. at 44.) Plaintiffs
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rely on this argument based on their contention that simply alleging that Defendant owed
Plaintiffs an amount of underinsured motorist coverage equal to their liability limits
satisfies their notice requirements. (Appellants' Br. at 27.) If this Court accepted
Plaintiffs' argument, then Defendant could also have been theoretically on notice of a
myriad of other potential claims. For example, Defendant could have been potentially
liable for higher UIM limits based on theories of equitable estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, reformation, or detrimental reliance, to name a few. But, like
Plaintiffs' claim arising under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g), Defendant had no
notice of any of these other potential theories of liability because nothing in Plaintiffs'
Complaint even suggested these legal theories. In fact, the substantive allegations of
Plaintiffs' Complaint regarding the lack of a signed acknowledgement show a clear intent
to rely on subsection (b).
In sum, the trial court did not commit any error in granting Defendant summary
judgment in light of Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead any claim related to their new
argument under subsection "g."
B.

The Trial Court's Ruling is Consistent with the Rulings of Other Utah
Courts.

In Asael, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether the allegations in the
plaintiffs complaint satisfied the notice requirements stated above. The court noted:
Nowhere in the third amended complaint, or in the three complaints that
preceded it, does [plaintiff] allege that any of the defendants had actually
bound adequate coverage but refused to pay the amounts due under that
orally bound policy. Rather [plaintiffs] claims, which all arise out of its
contention that the defendants failed to ensure that [plaintiff] was covered
for all of its significant risks, are directly contrary to such a position. And
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we see nothing in the complaint to suggest that [plaintiff] intended to assert
the existence of adequate coverage as an alternative theory. Consequently,
the third amended complaint does not give Appellees fair notice of the
nature and basis of the oral binder theory and was therefore not properly
before the court at the time of summary judgment.
2008 UT App 315, %l8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
This case reveals three important similarities to the present case. First, the court
did not allow the plaintiff to present a claim that was "directly contrary" to its previous
position. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs first claimed that their insurance policy was a
"new" policy. (R. at 434.) The only other option was that such a policy constituted an
"existing" policy, which is exactly opposite of their claim that it was "new." Second, the
Asael court analyzed "the complaint" to see if the claim was raised as an alternate theory,
and made no attempt to determine whether discovery had occurred on that particular
claim or whether the opposing party had some other "notice" and opportunity to defend.
Finally, the court held that this new issue was "not properly before the court at the time of
summary judgment." Plaintiffs here similarly requested that the trial court consider, for
the first time, their "existing" policy claim under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) "at
the time of summary judgment," which the Utah Court of Appeals has expressly denied.
Ultimately, the Asael court concluded as follows:
[Plaintiffs] oral binder claim was first raised, after approximately three
years of discovery, in Fair's memorandum in opposition to [defendant's]
motion for summary judgment. Rejecting this tactic, the Utah Supreme
Court explained: "A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel
claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment because such amendment fails to
satisfy Utah's pleading requirements?^
Id. at \ 18 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002
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UT 38, If 31, 48 P.3d 895). Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy Utah's pleading
requirements.
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed the tactics being used by Plaintiffs in
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook. In Holmes, the plaintiff attempted to raise new claims for
breach of duties outside those duties imposed by the contract at issue and which plaintiff
had not raised in its complaint. 2002 UT 38, ^f 30. The court responded by stating that
the "claim was originally raised in [plaintiffs] memorandum in opposition to
[defendant's] motion to dismiss/for summary judgment, and was not raised in the
complaint. . . . [Plaintiff's] claims must therefore be restricted to the grounds set forth in
the complaint" Id. at ^ 31 (emphasis added). Again, the Utah Supreme Court did not
analyze or address whether the defendant had an opportunity to engage in discovery
related to the new claim raised for the first time or whether it had adequate notice beyond
the notice required in the complaint. Likewise, the trial court did not allow Plaintiffs to
raise their new "existing" policy claim when considering Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
The Utah Court of Appeals in Harper v. Evans also came to the same conclusion
reached by numerous Utah courts regarding Plaintiffs' attempt to make new claims not
raised in their Complaint. In Harper, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant "negligently
performed the November 2002 surgeries 'and nothing more.'" 2008 UT App 165, f 13,
185 P.3d 573 (quoting Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, \ 11 n.9, 984 P.2d 960). However,
plaintiff attempted to raise a new argument of defendant's negligent course of treatment
after the surgeries. The court held that "[t]hese allegations, standing alone, do not state a
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claim for relief for continuous negligent treatment, even under Utah's liberal notice
pleading requirements." Harper, 2008 UT App 165, ^[ 13. The court further explained:
In so holding, we emphasize that we cannot rely on the allegations of a
negligent course of treatment raised for the first time in the Harpers'
opposition to summary judgment.... The Harpers were free to seek leave
to amend their complaint to allege new or different causes of action, see
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), but having failed to do so they could not effectively
raise such new claims in their opposition brief. See Holmes Dev., 2002 UT
38, ^ 31, 48 P.3d 895 (stating that in the absence of proper amendment,
"claims m u s t . . . be restricted to the grounds set forth in the complaint").
Id. at \ 14. At the time of the summary judgment proceedings, Plaintiffs had not even
sought to amend their complaint, presumably because Utah case law prohibited them
from amending at this late stage in litigation, especially when all discovery deadlines had
passed, and Defendant would be prejudiced by being required to file an answer to an
amended complaint, re-open discovery, conduct extensive discovery on the new issue
raised, and further delay resolution of this matter which was ready to be tried. In any
event, this Court should not consider any claims that have not been timely and properly
raised.
Following the identical analysis that this Court used in Asael, and consistent with
the decisions in Holmes and Harper, the trial court properly concluded that "Plaintiffs9
[new] argument is directly contrary to their previous position." (R. at 720.) The trial
court further noted that Plaintiffs "made no attempt to even suggest [the "existing" policy
claim] as an alternate theory." (R. at 720-21.) Finally, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs
had not made a request to amend their Complaint. (R. at 72 L) Based on the foregoing,
the trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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II.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' THREE POST-JUDGMENT
MOTIONS.2
It is well established under Utah law that "[fjailure to timely file an appeal

pursuant to Rule 4 constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal. Additionally, failure to
make a timely filing deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal." State v.
Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, If 23, 62 P.3d 444. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal in
response to the trial court's Memorandum Decision denying their three post-judgment
motions, but before the trial court entered a final order on those motions. (R. at 858-60.)
These three post-judgment motions consisted of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the
judgment, a Rule 15(b) motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence, and a Rule
15(a) motion for leave to amend Plaintiffs' Complaint. {Id.) However, this Court lacks
the subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial of each of these three motions.
A.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review the Trial Court's Denial of
Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and have therefore prevented this Court from exercising jurisdiction over
review of the denial of their Rule 59(e) motion. A party has thirty days "after the date of
entry of the judgment or order to file a notice of appeal." See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). A
party may extend the time to appeal from entry of a judgment or order by filing "a motion
to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(C).
2

Defendant also incorporates its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition and its Reply
Memorandum in Support of Summary Disposition into this section of Appellee's Brief.
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However, when a party files a post-judgment motion, the following rule applies:
A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of
judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any
motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice
of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying
judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal
or an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order.
Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2) (emphasis added). Based on the clear and unequivocal language
of this rule, Plaintiffs were required to file an amended notice of appeal, but failed to do

Plaintiffs filed three post-judgment motions, including a motion under Rule 59 to
alter or amend the judgment, after the trial court prepared the initial Memorandum
Decision granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 765-68.) The trial
court denied these three post-judgment motions in a Memorandum Decision dated April
1, 2009, which was not the final order of the court on these motions. (R. at 846-51.)
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 30, 2009. The trial court
then entered a final order disposing of Plaintiffs' post-judgment motions on May 8, 2009.
(R. at 865-68.)
Under the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b)(2), Plaintiffs' Notice of
3

The federal equivalent of this rule also requires the filing of an amended notice of appeal, and states:
(ii) A party intending to challenge an order disposing of any motion listed in
Rule 4(a)(4) A), or a judgment altered or amended upon such a motion, must file
a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal—in compliance with Rule
3(c)—within the time prescribed by this Rule measured from the entry of the
order disposing of the last such remaining motion.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
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Appeal, having been filed prior to entry of the order disposing of their Rule 59 motion,
"is effective only to appeal from the underlying judgment." In this case, the Notice of
Appeal conveys jurisdiction to this Court to review only the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, and not the trial court's denial of the subsequent Rule 59 motion.
In order to provide this Court jurisdiction to review the denial of their Rule 59 motion,
Plaintiffs were required to file an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order pursuant to Rule 4(b)(2), which in this case was
thirty (30) days after entry of the order denying such motion on May 8, 2009. However,
Plaintiffs did not file an amended notice of appeal at any time after entry of the May 8,
2009 order. Therefore, Plaintiffs' failure to file an amended notice of appeal prevents
this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction to review the district court's denial
of their Rule 59 motion.
B.

This Court Should Deny Plaintiffs' Request for Wholesale
Abandonment of Rule 4(b)(2).

Plaintiffs primarily argue that Rule 4(c) governs all appeals, including appeals of
post-judgment motions, instead of Rule 4(b)(2), contrary to the plain language of these
Rules. Prior to November 1, 2005, a party that filed a notice of appeal prior to
disposition of any of the post-judgment motions listed in Rule 4 was required to file an
amended notice of appeal. Otherwise, the entire notice of appeal was invalid.
In an effort to ameliorate this harsh result, the Utah Supreme Court amended Rule
4 and created subsection (b)(2), which validated any notice of appeal filed prior to entry
of an order on any of the listed post-judgment motions. Based on this amendment, a
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party was no longer required to file an amended notice of appeal to preserve its appeal of
the "underlying judgment." However, Rule 4(b)(2) still required a party to file an
amended notice of appeal in order to preserve an appeal from the trial court's ruling on
the post-judgment motions, which did not constitute the "underlying judgment."
Based on the creation of subsection (b)(2), this special rule only applied to cases
where a party filed one of the listed post-judgment motions. Rule 4(c) applies to the rest
of cases where no post-judgment motion is filed. However, Plaintiffs now urge this
Court to conclude that Rule 4(c) should govern all notices of appeal, requiring
abandonment of Rule 4(b)(2). This argument contradicts well-established statutory
construction principles which require this Court to give meaning, if possible, to all
provisions of a statute, or in this case, to a Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Lund v.
Brown, 2000 UT 75, ^ 2 3 , 11 P.3d 277 (applying statutory construction principles to
interpretation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "[a]ny
interpretation which renders part or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous should
be avoided." Id. (quoting State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995)). In this case,
Plaintiffs urge this Court to make rule 4(b)(2) inoperative and superfluous. Therefore,
giving meaning to Rule 4(b)(2), this Court should rule that Plaintiffs' failure to file an
amended notice of appeal to include the three post-judgment motions prevents this Court
from exercising jurisdiction over such motions.
In addition to requesting that this Court render Rule 4(b)(2) meaningless, Plaintiffs
also incorrectly interpret the clear language of this Rule in stating the following:
The trial court's Memorandum Decision denying the
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Casadays1 post-judgment motion was dated April 1, 2009,
signed April 2, 2009, and filed April 7, 2009. The Casadays
filed their notice of appeal on April 30, 2009, after the court
announced its decision denying their post-judgment motion
and within thirty days of the earliest possible date from which
the time to appeal could have run.
(Mem. Opp'n. Mot. Summ. Disposition, at 10 (emphasis added).) Such a conclusion that
the appeal period could have run from the date of the Memorandum Decision on April 1,
2009 contradicts Utah law. Plaintiffs elaborate on this misconstruction of Utah law in
their "Response to Allstate's Statement of Facts," in which they state:
However, the Memorandum Decision also did not state that it
was not the final order of the court, and it did not direct
counsel to prepare a written order. It simply said that
"Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted."
Thus, the January 9, 2009 Memorandum Decision could have
constituted a final appealable order.
{Id. at 3 (emphasis added).) Based on these statements, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the
necessary application of the ruling in Code v. Utah Dept. of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162
P.3d 1097.
In Code, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether a memorandum decision
issued by a district court constituted entry of a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Id.
at f 4. The Code court held that under Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
a memorandum decision does not constitute the final order of the court unless it explicitly
so states. Id. atfflf5-6. In that case, the memorandum decision did not state that it was
the final order of the court, and did not instruct a party to prepare an order. Id. at ^f 5. In
response to this factual scenario, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The plain language of rule 7(f)(2) does not permit overriding
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the requirement of an order by implication or inference.
Either an order must be submitted by the prevailing party or
the court must give the parties explicit direction that no order
is required. We see no benefit to a system in which parties
must guess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a judge's
language in a memorandum decision "implie[s]," "invite[s],"
or "contemplate[s]" further action by the parties. Not only
would such a system be unwise in practice, it is at odds with
the express mandate of rule 7(f)(2). It is the district court's
role to clearly direct that no order needs to be submitted;
otherwise, an order is required. A court should include this
explicit direction whenever it intends a document—a
memorandum decision, minute entry, or other document—to
constitute its final action. Otherwise, rule 7(f)(2) requires the
preparation and filing of an order to trigger finality for
purposes of appeal.
Id. at f 6 (emphasis in original)(internal citations omitted). Here, neither party submitted
a proposed order in conjunction with their memoranda, nor did the Memorandum
Decision explicitly direct the parties to forego submission of an order. Therefore, based
on the holding in Code, the trial court's Memorandum Decision dated April 1, 2009 did
not constitute the final, appealable order, and did not commence the running of the
limitations period for preserving the appeal.
Given this misconstruction of Utah law, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 4(b)(2) should
be limited only to situations where a notice of appeal is filed before announcement of a
trial court's decision on a post-judgment motion, rather than to a notice of appeal filed
after announcement of a decision. This argument lacks merit and reason, and begs the
questions as to why any party would ever file a notice of appeal of a post-judgment
motion before a trial court even rules on the motion. Although a party may anticipate
losing a post-judgment motion, there is no reason to undergo the time and expense in
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preparing a notice of appeal when the party does not even know the trial court's decision,
let alone filing such an appeal with the court. Therefore, Plaintiffs' interpretation of Rule
4(b)(2) would inappropriately and illogically restrict its scope to impossible scenarios.
This Court should resist such a wholesale abandonment of Rule 4(b)(2) as
Plaintiffs implicitly urge, and should hold that Plaintiffs' failure to file an amended notice
of appeal after entry of the order disposing of their post-judgment motions prevents this
Court from exercising jurisdiction over all issues other than the underlying judgment.
C.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review the Trial Court's Denial of
Plaintiffs' Rule 15 Motions.

In addition to the Rule 59 motion, Plaintiffs also filed two motions under Rules
15(a) and 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, this Court also lacks
jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of these two motions, each of which sought
permission from the trial court to allow amendment of Plaintiffs' Complaint. This very
Court established that a plaintiff cannot obtain relief in the form of amendment to a
pleading under Rule 15 unless the trial court first grants either a Rule 59(e) or 60(b)
motion. See National Advertising Co. v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App 75, % 13, 131
P.3d 872 (citing Combs v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 382 F.3d 1196, 1205 (10th Cir.
2004) ("After a district court enters a final judgment it may not entertain motions for
leave to amend unless the court first sets aside or vacates the judgment pursuant to [rules]
59(e) or 60(b)."); Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C, 2006 UT App 305, f 28, 145 P.3d
1146 (quoting Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1976)).
In this case, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion. Based on Rule 4
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of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiffs failed to preserve any right to appeal
the denial of the Rule 59 motion for failing to file an amended notice of appeal after entry
of the final order. Since Plaintiffs cannot obtain review of the trial court's denial of their
Rule 59(e) motion, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the denial of the
Plaintiffs' Rule 15 motions, because the prerequisite to such review, i.e. the granting of
either a Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion, is also outside the jurisdictional reach of this Court.
Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs'
Rule 15 motions.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 59(e) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE
JUDGMENT.
Even if this Court were to conclude that Plaintiffs had somehow properly

preserved their appeal of the trial court's denial of their three post-judgment motions
despite their failure to comply with Rule 4(b)(2), the trial court still did not abuse its
discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. In
order to merit relief under Rule 59(e), a party must show any of the grounds set forth
under Rule 59(a). See Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d 309, 311
(Utah 1979). In this case, Plaintiffs claim entitlement to relief based on (1) "[A]buse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial[;] (6) Insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law[;] and (7)
Error in law." (R. at 728; Appellants5 Br. at 34.)
In sole support of their Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiffs raised a new argument which
they had not raised during the summary judgment proceedings—that they mistakenly
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alleged the wrong statute in their Complaint. That argument lacks any merit in light of
Plaintiffs5 other allegations herein. Despite this new argument, the trial court found that
Plaintiffs had failed to establish entitlement to relief under Rule 59(e) for several reasons.
Plaintiffs' new argument of erroneous citation to the wrong statute lacks merit and the
cases cited by Plaintiffs support Defendant's position. Finally, Plaintiffs have
misconstrued the basis for the trial court's denial of their motion.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court cited to several justifications which
support its denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion, and which show that it did not abuse
its discretion. First, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs were attempting to raise a new
argument which had not been previously raised in their Complaint. (R. at 866.) Second,
Plaintiffs failed to distinguish the Asael case or otherwise show its inapplicability to the
present case. (Id.) Third, Plaintiffs' new argument was directly contrary to the argument
made in their Complaint, i.e. that Plaintiffs had a "new" policy requiring Defendant to
comply with Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-305(9)(b). (Id.) Fourth, Plaintiffs had not even
made an attempt, prior to the grant of summary judgment, to seek leave to amend their
Complaint to include their new argument. (R. at 867.) Fifth, Plaintiffs were attempting
to contravene the trial court's case management order by attempting to raise new claims
after all discovery deadlines had passed, and after they realized that their claims failed as
a matter of law. (Id.)
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B.

Plaintiffs' Claim That They Cited to the Wrong Statute in Error Lacks
Merit.

Once Plaintiffs determined that their Complaint failed to meel Utah's liberal
pleading standard, they raised a new argument which they failed to raise during the
summary judgment proceedings. This new argument alleges that Plaintiffs simply cited
to the wrong statute, as if it were some type of clerical error. (R. at 732-35; Appellants'
Br. at 3, 34.) This argument lacks merit in light of the other allegations in Plaintiffs'
Complaint.
Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint specifically alleges that "plaintiffs were
insured by defendant under an automobile insurance policy which was issued by
defendant after January 1, 200IT (R. at 2, % 4 (emphasis added).) Also, Plaintiffs'
Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs never signed a UIM acknowledgment form for
Defendant. (R. at 2, ^j 8.) Such signed acknowledgement forms are required only for
new policies, not for existing policies as of January 1, 2001. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-305(9)(g). For Plaintiffs to claim that their reference to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9)(b) was simply an error on their part, would require this Court to ignore all other
efforts by Plaintiffs to allege that Defendant failed to comply with the statutory
requirements specific to "new" insurance policies issued after January 1, 2001 as stated in
this statute. Plaintiffs' "new policy" argument was central to Plaintiffs' allegation of
supposed bad faith, so Plaintiffs cannot discard that claim so easily.
C.

The Cases Cited by Plaintiffs Support Defendant's Position,

Additionally, in their Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Motion to Alter
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or Amend the Judgment, to Conform the Pleadings to the Evidence, or For Leave to
Amend, Plaintiffs cite to several cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that a
mere recitation to an incorrect statute should not deprive a party from pursuing claims.
(R. at 817 n. 14-15.) However, these cases support Defendant's position that it did not
have adequate notice of Plaintiffs' new argument regarding their "existing" insurance
policy.
For example, Plaintiffs cite to the case of Huss v. Green Spring Health Serv., Inc.,
18 F.Supp2d 400,402 (D. Del. 1998) (R. at 817 n. 15.), where the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware quoted from Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure §1210, and stated: "[a] reference to the wrong statute . . . will be corrected by
the court if it can determine the appropriate statute . . .from the complaint.'" 18
F.Supp.2d 400, 402 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1210, at 121.) By this very standard, the trial
court could not have determined which statute Plaintiffs intended to reference based on
the allegations in their Complaint. The Complaint simply stated the allegations that
Plaintiffs had a "new" policy and that Defendant failed to provide coverage based on
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) and Utah law. (R. at 4-5,ffij12-16.) However,
nothing in the Complaint would lead the trial court, Defendant, or this Court, to
determine Plaintiffs' reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) regarding
"existing" policies as a separate basis for recovery.
Similarly, Plaintiffs cite to the case of Roman v. City oj Middletown Bd. ofEduc,
(R. at 817 n. 15.) for the proposition that a court should not grant summary judgment
29

"against a plaintiff based on her reference to the wrong statutes because "the facts
pleadfed] in the Complaint do state a cause of action " under the correct statute. "
(Mem. Supp. Mot. to Alter or Amend 8 n.15 (emphasis added) (quoting 2007 WL
866480, at *3 (Conn. Super Ct. 2007)).
Plaintiffs' errors amount to more than a mere incorrect citation to the appropriate
statute—they represent a failure altogether to support any claim under subsection "g."
Here, Plaintiffs' Complaint completely failed to advise Defendant of the factual essence
of their new bad faith theory. Furthermore, this effort to change the factual basis for a
bad faith claim reveals the mercurial nature of the claim, and its lack of legitimacy. This
Court should resist Plaintiffs' mischaracterization of the failure in their Complaint as
merely a citation to a wrong statute and uphold the trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment due to Plaintiffs' failure to even allege any facts to support their
claims under subsection "g" and their failure even to request leave of court to amend their
Complaint.
D,

Plaintiffs Misconstrue the Trial Court's Basis for Grant of Summary
Judgment and Denial of Their Rule 59(e) Motion.

In addition to improperly characterizing their citation to Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-305(9)(b) as a mere error in citation, Plaintiffs have misconstrued the basis for the
trial court's grant of summary judgment or denial of their motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59(e). In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs sumraarize the trial court's
actions in granting summary judgment and denying their Rule 59(e) motion by stating
that the trial court "held that the Casadays' reference in their complaint to subsection (b)
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of section 31 A-22-305(9) was fatal to their claims." (Appellants' Br. at 34.) This was
not the trial court's basis for granting summary judgment or denying their motion. What
was "fatal to their claims" was Plaintiffs' failure to make a single allegation in the
Complaint to put Defendant on notice of their new claim under subsection "g."
The trial court relied on this Court's decision in Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck
Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315, 193 P.3d 650 to grant Defendant summary judgment. (R.
at 720-21; see also R. at 801, ^J 7 (discussing Plaintiffs' contradictory new claim).) It
should be noted that Plaintiffs failed even to cite the Asael case in their entire appellate
brief, much less to distinguish it from the present case. Based on that case, it became
apparent that Plaintiffs' new argument, which took a completely contradictory position to
that stated in their Complaint, could not withstand the analysis set forth by this Court.
In summary, even if this Court were to find that it has jurisdiction of Plaintiff s
Rule 59(e) motion despite Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should still find that the trial court did not abuse
its broad discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment under
Rule 59(e). Plaintiffs' sole argument in support of this motion is that they made an error
in citing to the wrong statute. This argument, however, lacks merit based on the obvious
reference to this statute in paragraphs 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, which specifically
states that their insurance policy was obtained after January 1, 2001 and refers to
requirements applicable only to new policies. Furthermore, the cases which Plaintiffs
rely on to support their claim of erroneous citation ironically support Defendant's
position that nothing in the Complaint could point to Plaintiffs' new basis of recovery
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under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g). Finally, Plaintiffs have misconstrued the
basis of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment and deny their Rule 59(e)
motion, and have failed altogether even to mention the Asael case, on which the trial
court relied heavily for support of its rulings. Therefore, this Court should uphold the
trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' RULE
15(b) MOTION TO CONFORM THE PLEADINGS TO THE EVIDENCE.
This Court should uphold the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs'' Rule 15(b) motion

to conform the pleadings to the evidence, for four reasons. First, Rule 15(b) does not
apply to motions for summary judgment. Second, even if this Rule applied, Defendant
failed to file this motion on a timely basis. Third, the trial court could not grant relief
under this Rule because it denied Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion. Fourth, Defendant never
"tried" any issue not raised in the pleadings by express or implied consent.
A.

Rule 15(b) Does Not Apply to Summary Judgment Proceedings.

Rule 15(b) does not even apply to motions for summary judgment. Although
Plaintiffs assert that "Rule 15(b) applies to motions as well as to trials," (R. at 736;
Appellants' Br. at 35.), they overlook Utah law in making such a bold assertion.4
Whether Rule 15(b) applies to motions for summary judgment in Utah has never been
specifically decided by our courts. See Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, ^[35,
166 P.3d 639. In fact, there is stronger case law support for the assertion that Rule 15(b)
does not apply to motions for summary judgment. See id. at % 35 n.13. Rule 15(b) makes
4

This Court should note that in making this assertion, Plaintiffs cite to New York and South Dakota cases for
support, and not to a Utah case.
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sense in the context of trials, where evidence is submitted, not in the context of pre-trial
motions.
The Eldridge court points out that a split exists among the federal circuits as to
whether Rule 15(b) applies to summary judgments as opposed to trials. Id. at ^[35 n.13.
However, the court also pointed out that most recently, the Utah Supreme Court has cited
with approval the case of Domar Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining Co., 783 F.2d
1185,1188 (5th Cir. 1986), which states that implied consent only applies if parties
recognized that an issue not raised in the pleadings was admitted at trial. Id. (citing
Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409,413 (Utah 1998) and Keller v. SouthwoodN. Med.
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1998) for support that Rule 15(b) only applies to
trials and not to summary judgments).
Additionally, nothing in Rule 15(b) specifically allows its application on a motion
for summary judgment and, in fact, specifically states that it applies only to "trials." Rule
15(b) used the word "tried" once and "trial" twice. Therefore, consistent with the recent
trend in Utah courts in acknowledging that Rule 15(b) applies to "trials," and based on
the clear and unambiguous language of the Rule itself, this Court should hold that Rule
15(b) does not apply in this case after the granting of summary judgment.
B.

Plaintiffs Failed to File a Timely Motion Under Rule 15(b).

Utah courts have long held that denial of a motion to amend based on untimeliness
is not an abuse of discretion. See Atcitty v. Bd. ofEduc. of San Juan Cty. Sch. Dist, 967
P.2d 1261 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Atcitty, the court addressed the timeliness of
plaintiffs motion to amend and held the following:
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying appellant's Motion to Amend. First, appellant
attempted to set forth new issues in his amended complaint.
Second, appellant filed his motion approximately two-and-ahalf months after the discovery deadline, and after both
parties hadfiled summary judgment motions. Third, we
conclude that appellant was aware of the unew issues " raised
in the amended complaint long before his motion was filed,
and that there was no justifiable reason for the delay. We
therefore affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's Motion
to Amend his complaint.
Id. at 1264-65 (emphasis added). In this case, Plaintiffs run afoul of each of the factors
addressed in Atcitty, except that Plaintiffs' actions are even more egregious. Plaintiffs
certainly waited until well over one year after the original case management order
deadline for fact discovery had passed (R. at 38) and over eight months passed after the
amended scheduling order deadline for fact discovery (R. at 238) before filing their
Motion for Leave to Amend. Second, Plaintiffs waited until after Defendant had filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 419-20.) Third, by Plaintiffs' own admissions,
they were aware of the "new" issue raised in their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment long before they filed their motion. (R. at 434, 445.) Finally,
Plaintiffs have failed to provide any justifiable reason for the delay.5 Therefore, this
Court should find that Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion was untimely in light of the broad
discretion applicable to such a finding.
C.

The Trial Court Could Not Grant Relief Under Rule 15(b) Based on its
Denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) Motion.

As more fully briefed in Part II.C, supra, the trial court did not err in denying
5

Plaintiffs only unjustified reason is that they believed that simply alleging that Defendant had breached "Utah law"
was all that was necessary to meet Utah's liberal pleading standard and that they believed that their Complaint was
sufficiently broad to include the new claim. (Appellants' Br. at 46.)
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Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion because it did not grant Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion, a
prerequisite to such relief. Without amending the judgment, the trial court could not
allow amendment of a pleading. See National Advertising Co. v. Murray City Corp.,
2006 UT App 75, % 13, 131 P.3d 872. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial
court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion.
D.

Defendant Never Expressly or Impliedly Tried Any Issue Not Raised in
the Pleadings.

"To determine whether a trial court properly denied a motion to amend the
complaint to conform to the evidence, we first review for correctness the trial 'court's
conclusion that the parties tried [or did not try] an issue by express or implied consent.'"
Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243 at ^[19 (quoting Fibro Trust, Inc. v Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999
UT 13, | 8, 974 P.2d 288. Based on rule 15(b), there are "two situations in which a party
may seek to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. The first situation—the
mandatory amendment—requires the trial court to allow amendment of the pleadings if
the parties tried the issues by express or implied consent." Id. at f 36. "The second
situation—the permissive amendment—applies where the parties did not try the issue by
express or implied consent." Id. at f 37. "[I]n instances where the parties did not try the
issues by express or implied consent,
[t]he trial court's discretion to grant amendment of the
pleadings is conditioned on the satisfaction of two
preliminary requirements: [1] a finding that the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved by amendment
and [2] a finding that the admission of such evidence would
not prejudice the adverse party.... The trial court has only
limited discretion in making these preliminary findings
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Id. (quoting Fibro Trust, Inc., 1999 UT 13 at ^[ 9). Finally,
if the parties did not try the issues by express or implied
consent but the two preliminary requirements have been met,
"the trial court has full discretion to allow amendment of the
pleadings; that is, it may grant or deny a party's motion for
amendment upon any reasonable basis, and the court's
decision can be reversed only if abuse of discretion appears."
Id. Here, the trial court never ruled as to whether Defendant had "tried" the "existing"
policy claim under subsection "g." However, if it had, it is irrefutable that Defendant
neither expressly nor impliedly consented to this new argument. Defendant filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 419-20.) Plaintiffs filed a responsive
memorandum in opposition, arguing the subsection (g) existing insurance policy position.
(R. at 432-46.) Defendant expressly refused to engage Plaintiffs on that issue in
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Ex.
"l,"at2-8.)) 6
This very Court in Eldridge specifically found that no "trial" of new issues
occurred where a party "clearly objected to the [plaintiffs'] introduction of new claims
whenever they arose. 2007 UT App 243 at <f 38. Plaintiffs raised their new claim under
subsection "g" for "existing" policies for the very first time in their Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 443-48.) At the very first
opportunity, Defendants made clear their objection to the introduction of Plaintiffs' new
claim in its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Ex. " 1 , "
at 2-8.) Defendant has never consented to Plaintiffs' request that this Court consider this
6

The trial court entered an order under Rule 11(h) supplementing the record to include Defendant's Reply Memo in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as Ex. "1.")
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new claim.
Despite Defendant's clear objections to the introduction of Plaintiffs' new claims,
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant impliedly consented to this new claim in its affirmative
defense and by failing to object to Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's request for
admissions when Plaintiffs were asked to admit that subsection "b" did not apply.
(Appellants' Br. at 37.) However, this argument only supports Defendants' contention
that it disputed Plaintiffs' claims raised in their Complaint. Furthermore, Defendant had
no reason to object to Plaintiffs' admission that subsection "b" did not apply, since
Defendant's position was always that subsection "b" was in applicable. Plaintiffs' claims
that a substantial amount of discovery took place on subsection "g" is also unavailing
since Plaintiffs were entitled to conduct discovery on any of Defendant's affirmative
defenses, which included the defense that subsection "b" did not apply because Plaintiffs
did not have a "new" policy. Ultimately, Defendant never consented to trial of any part
of Plaintiffs' new claims under subsection "g." Discovery does not constitute trial of an
issue. Even if this Court made the unlikely finding that discovery in this case showed an
implicit "trial" of the new claim, the trial court still had a wide range of discretion in
denying amendment under Rule 15(b)'s permissive prong. Therefore, this Court should
uphold the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 15(a) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR
COMPLAINT.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a)

motion for leave to amend their complaint. For the reasons stated in Part IV.B., supra,
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Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) motion is also untimely. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in Part
IV.C, supra, the trial court could not have granted relief under Rule 15(a) because it did
not grant relief under Rule 59(e). Thus, the trial court had no choice but to deny
Plaintiffs Rule 15(a) motion. Alternatively, and despite these two compelling reasons
for the trial court's denial of this motion, Plaintiffs have otherwise failed to show
entitlement to relief under Rule 15(a).
Utah courts focus on a three-pronged test for determining the appropriateness of
granting a motion to amend under Rule 15(a). In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert,
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[i]n analyzing the grant or denial of a motion to
amend, Utah courts have focused on three factors: the timeliness of the motion; the
justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting prejudice to the
responding party." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, f 26, 87 P.3d
734 (quoting Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), rev'don other grounds by 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992)).
However, "courts should not regard these three factors as an exclusive list." Kelly,
2004 UT App 44 at f 39. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "the[se] factors
should be considered alongside any other factors that the trial court might deem relevant
in a particular case." Id. at f 40 (emphasis added) (citing Aurora Credit Servs., v. Liberty
West. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Utah 1998)). "[T]his open-factored approach is
consistent with the broad grant of discretion that is afforded to trial courts when ruling on
motions to amend" because
[tjrial courts are in a much better position than appellate
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courts to make such case-specific determinations as whether
too much time has passed to fairly allow an amendment,
whether a party's delay is the result of an unfair tactic or
dilatory motive, or whether some other unforeseen factor
militates for or against a particular result in that particular
case.... Thus, insofar as our earlier cases have perhaps led
some to conclude that rule 15(a) is governed by an exclusive
three-part analysis, we now wish to stress that the motion to
amend analysis is instead a multi-factored, flexible inquiry
that allows trial courts the leeway to evaluate the factual
circumstances and legal developments involved in each
particular case.
Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at f U .
Unfortunately, the trial court did not reach this analysis in denying Plaintiffs' Rule
15(a) motion. With this backdrop, this Court should uphold the trial court's denial of
Plaintiffs' motion to amend under Rule 15(a). Plaintiffs' motion is indisputably
untimely. It came several months after the end of fact discovery, after Defendant filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment, and after the trial court granted summary judgment.
Also, Plaintiffs have never given a single, justifiable reason as to why they waited so long
to seek leave to amend their Complaint, stating that they simply believed their reference
to breach of "Utah law" somehow met Utah's notice pleading standard. Finally,
Defendant would be extremely prejudiced by the untimely amendment of Plaintiffs'
Complaint in that they would have to re-open fact discovery, determine whether
additional experts are needed, change their entire litigation strategy, re-depose several
witnesses, and incur the additional expenses of such discovery, all based on Plaintiffs'

7

The trial court denied the Rule 15(a) motion because Plaintiffs' had not met their burden under Rule 59(e) and had
not distinguished the Asael case. (R. at 849.) Even if this Court allowed amendment of the judgment under Rule
59(e), it would have to remand back to the trial court the decision as to whether amendment under either Rule 15(a)
or 15(b) is appropriate in light of the broad discretion given to trial courts in deciding these issues.
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failure to adequately plead the claims they now contend to have been adequately raised in
their Complaint.
In Kelly, this Court reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion to amend.
2004 UT App 44 at *f 47. In doing so, the court discussed reasons why plaintiffs motion
to amend should have been granted. The court stated:
Under the general principles set forth above, we conclude that
the trial court should have granted Kelly's motion to amend.
We first note that the litigation was still in its initial
procedural stages when Kelly filed his motion to amend. The
trial court had not yet established any deadlines for discovery
or for the filing of amended complaints, nor had the court yet
set a date for trial or entered any rulings dismissing any of the
claims or parties. Kelly's motion to amend was filed on April
2, 2002, barely six months after the filing of the original
complaint. This litigation had not yet concluded its first year,
let alone gone through the several years of litigation that are
typically present in cases of untimeliness.
Further, it does not appear from the record that Kelly's delay
in seeking leave to add the additional claims was motivated
by a dilatory or improper motive.
Id. at Yh 49-50. Every single one of these factors weighs against Plaintiffs and in
Defendant's favor.
First, the litigation in this case was not in its initial procedural stage when
Plaintiffs filed their motions to amend; rather the case was concluded by summary
judgment. Second, this Court had already established a deadline for fact discovery,
which ended on December 31, 2007 under the original Case Management Order. (R. at
38.) Plaintiffs' motions to amend were filed well over two years after commencement of
this action. Finally, based on Plaintiffs' failure to provide a single reason or justification
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for failing to seek leave to amend earlier, no other reason for their failure exists other
than a dilatory or improper motive.
In addition to the fact that each of these factors weigh heavily in Defendant's
favor, it is not essential that every factor weigh in Defendant's favor. In addressing
whether any particular factor is more important than the other when considering a motion
to amend, this Court stated:
Finally, although the general approach should be multifactored, the circumstances of a particular case may be such
that a court's ruling on a motion to amend can be predicated
on only one of two of the particular factors. See First City
Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 1127,
1133 (10th Cir. 1987) ("We hold that a district court acts
within the bounds of its discretion when it denies leave to
amend for 'untimeliness" or 'undue delay.' Prejudice to the
opposing party need not be shown also."). Thus, depending
on the facts of a particular case, the weight that a court gives
to one or another particular factor may vary.
Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at ^f 42. Thus, while all of the factors listed above support denial
of Plaintiffs' motion to amend under Rule 15(a), this Court can give different weight to
any particular factor.
In addition, as noted previously, Plaintiffs' effort to amend is not legitimate.
Plaintiffs contended in their Complaint that Defendant acted in bad faith because it
refused to acknowledge that the insurance policy at issue was a new policy. When they
ultimately concluded that this argument was fallacious, they persisted in their assertion of
bad faith but tried to find a different fact or theory to support their bad faith claims.
Essentially, they started with the conclusion—bad faith—then worked backwards to find
theories or facts to support it, all without making a formal change to their Complaint.
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In summary, Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) motion is untimely. More importantly, the trial
court properly denied this motion based on its denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion.
Despite these two compelling reasons, and applying the very analysis and factors used by
the Holmes and Kelly courts, this Court should find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Plaintiffs Rule 15(a) motion.
CONCLUSION
This case deals with Plaintiffs' unfounded contention that they are entitled to more
UIM coverage than what they were actually paying for, and what their insurance policy
actually stated. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant claiming that Defendant failed to
obtain the signed acknowledgement form required of a "new" insurance policy,
implicating Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). The suit alleged that Defendant had
acted in bad faith in failing to procure the waiver. However, once it became apparent to
Plaintiffs that their argument failed as a matter of law, they raised a new argument that
their policy was in fact an "existing" policy, implicating Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9)(g), still claiming that Defendant acted in bad faith. It is appzirent that Plaintiffs
intended to pursue an insurance bad faith claim no matter what the facts were. That is,
Plaintiffs started with the conclusion that Defendant had committed bad faith, and then
sought out facts or theories to support the claim; they allowed the result (bad faith
damages) to dictate their claims ("new" or "existing" policy.)
This Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on
Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead their new claim arising under Utah Code Ann. §
31 A-22-305(9)(g). This Court should also rule that Plaintiffs' failure to comply with
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Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure prevents it from exercising
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs5 three post-judgment motions. Alternatively, this Court should
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e)
motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence, based on the numerous justifications
given by the trial court. Without alteration or amendment of the judgment, Plaintiffs
could not obtain amendment of their pleadings pursuant to either Rules 15(a) or 15(b).
Consistent with the trial court's reasoning in granting summary judgment and denying
Plaintiffs' three post-judgment motions, this Court should uphold such rulings.
ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary as all pertinent statutes and rules are listed verbatim in
this brief.
DATED this 28th day of October, 2009.

T MILLER NELSON

A. Morgan
'Rafael A. Seminario
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND E. CASADAY and ELLEN
CASADAY,
Plaintiffs,

REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

tivil No. 060916782

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant.
Defendant Allstate Insurance Company, by and through its counsel of record, Lynn S.
Davies, Melinda A. Morgan, and Rafael A. Seminario of the law firm of RICHARDS BRANDT
MILLER NELSON, hereby submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment pursuant to Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the claims and issues raised in Plaintiffs'

Complaint. This complaint alleges that Plaintiffs had a "new policy" in 2001, that they never
signed a waiver of underinsured motorist coverage, and that Allstate therefore failed to comply
with Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). All claims and all theories of recovery stated in
Plaintiffs' complaint stem from the alleged violation of this specific statute. However, based on
the memoranda submitted by both parties related to this Motion for Summary Judgment, no
dispute exists that Plaintiffs' insurance policy was in fact an "existing" policy and not a "new"
policy as alleged by Plaintiffs. In fact, Plaintiffs have specifically stated that they "concede that
their policy would likely be considered as an existing policy, rather than a new policy.. . ."
(PL's Mem. Opp'n. Summ. J. 4.) Such an admission entitles Defendant to summary judgment.
In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiffs offer two arguments: (1) that their complaint
should be liberally construed so as to create claims not raised in their Complaint, and (2) that
questions of material fact exist on the unstated theories they now wish to present, i.e., the issue
of the SB 189 notice under §31A-22-305(9)(h). With regard to their first argument, Utah
appellate law unequivocally states that Plaintiffs' failure to include claims and grounds for such
claims in their complaint precludes this Court from addressing such claims in Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Regarding their second argument, this Court may not consider
it because Defendant has not even raised this issue in its summary judgment motion and because
the Complaint failed to raise SB 189 as an issue in this case, in stark contrast to the longestablished and basic jurisprudential principle that claims are restricted to those raised in the
Complaint.
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ARGUMENT
I.

NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST TO PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
This Court should grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the

admissions made in Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum. In it, Plaintiffs "concede that their
policy would likely be considered as an existing policy, rather than a new policy . . . ." (PL's
Mem. Opp'n. Summ. J. 4.) This admission refutes the allegations made in their own complaint
that Defendant failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b). That was their only
stated basis for all claims in their complaint. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have admitted that their
own experts agree that Defendant did not violate § 31A-22-305(9)(b). (See PL's Mem. Opp'n.
Summ. J. 5.) As a result, no dispute exists as to Defendant's entitlement to summary judgment
on the claims raised in Plaintiffs' complaint.
II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH'S NOTICE
PLEADING STANDARD, WHICH PREVENTS THEM FROM PURSUING
THEIR SB 189 CLAIM.
Utah law does not allow Plaintiffs to disregard their complaint and pursue claims not

previously and adequately raised. Plaintiffs argue that they did comply, and in support of this
argument, Plaintiffs cite (a) to several rules of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (b) to some
Utah cases which they believe support their position. These arguments fail in light of the clear
and unequivocal position that Utah appellate courts have taken on this issue over the last half
century.

3

a. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Comply With the Rules They Cite in Support of
Their Claim of Compliance with Utah's Notice Pleading Standard.
Plaintiffs erroneously rely on Rule 8(e)(1), 8(f), and 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to support their claim that they have preserved their SB 189 claim. Rather than
dispute their entitlement to recovery based on the allegations in their complaint related to § 31A22-305(9)(b), which they now understand to fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have stated that the
allegations, claims, and grounds in their complaint allow them to pursue a claim not explicitly
raised in their complaint. Rule 8(e)(1) requires allegations to be "simple, concise and direct,"
Rule 8(f) requires courts to construe pleadings in a manner consistent with "substantial justice,"
and Rule 1(a) requires courts to "liberally construe" pleadings. Plaintiffs have complied with all
of these requirements as they relate to their claims under § 31 A-22-305(9)(b); Defendant has
never argued to the contrary. However, Plaintiffs have completely failed to comply with these
requirements as they relate to their SB 189 claim.
It is well settled under Utah law that "a plaintiff is required, under [Utah's] liberal
pleading standard of notice pleading, to submit a "short and plain statement. .. showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for the relief" Canfield v. Layton City,
2005 UT 60, 14, 122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2)). In
addition, "[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Id. (citation
omitted). However, "zf must do at least that much." Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch.,
2008 UT App 315, % 17, 193 P.3d 650 (emphasis added) (citing Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App
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165, K 13, 185 P.3d 573. Here, Plaintiffs have not done "at least that much." Instead, Plaintiffs
have cited to the following portions of their complaint to support their argument that they have
provided the required "fair notice" to defendant:
12.
In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts,
defendant advised plaintiffs that their policy of insurance only provided
underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $10,000, up to $20,000
per occurrence.
15.
The defendant has refused to pay the limits of underinsured
motorist coverage required.. .by law.
The two citations accomplish only one thing—to allege that "Utah law" has been violated.
Plaintiffs now ask this Court to find that a reference to a breach of "Utah law" provides sufficient
notice to Defendant of the nature and basis of the claims asserted. Defendant cannot be expected
to canvas the entirety of "Utah law" to divine the claims Plaintiffs might someday assert.
Otherwise, all a plaintiff would have to do in a complaint is make a bald assertion that "Utah
law" has been violated in order to maintain a cause of action. Fortunately, several Utah courts
have addressed this issue and have refuted the position taken by Plaintiffs.
In Asael, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether the allegations in the plaintiffs
complaint satisfied the "fair notice" requirements stated above. The court stated:
Nowhere in the third amended complaint, or in the three complaints that preceded
it, does [plaintiff] allege that any of the defendants had actually bound adequate
coverage but refused to pay the amounts due under that orally bound policy.
Rather [plaintiffs] claims, which all arise out of its contention that the defendants
failed to ensure that [plaintiff] was covered for all of its significant risks, are
directly contrary to such a position. And we see nothing in the complaint to
suggest that [plaintiff] intended to assert the existence of adequate coverage as an
alternative theory. Consequently, the third amended complaint does not give
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Appellees fair notice of the nature and basis of the oral binder theory and was
therefore not properly before the court at the time of summary judgment.
2008 UT App 315, Tfl8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This case reveals three important
similarities to the present case. First, the court did not allow the plaintiff to present a claim that
was "directly contrary" to its previous position, which also applies in this case. Plaintiff first
claimed that their insurance policy was a "new" policy. The only other option was that such a
policy constituted an "existing" policy, which is exactly opposite of their claim that it was
"new." Second, the court analyzed "the complaint" to see if the claim was raised as an alternate
theory, and made no attempt to determine whether discovery had occurred on that particular
claim or whether the opposing party had some other "notice" and opportunity to defend which
Plaintiff claim applies. Finally, the court held that this new issue was "not properly before the
court at the time of summary judgment." Plaintiffs similarly request that this Court consider the
SB 189 claim "at the time of summary judgment," which the Court of Appeals has expressly
denied. Ultimately, the Asael court concluded as follows:
[Plaintiffs] oral binder claim was first raised, after approximately three years of
discovery, in Farr's memorandum in opposition to [defendant's] motion for
summary judgment. Rejecting this tactic, the Utah Supreme Court explained: "A
plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories for
recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment because such amendment^n/s to satisfy Utah 's pleading requirements."
Id. at f 18 (quoting Holmes Dev, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, K 31, 48 P.3d 895) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements.
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed the tactics being used by Plaintiffs in
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook. In Holmes, the plaintiff attempted to raise new claims for breach of
6

duties outside those duties imposed by the contract at issue and which plaintiff had not raised in
its complaint. 2002 UT 38, f 30. The court responded by stating that the "claim was originally
raised in [plaintiffs] memorandum in opposition to [defendant's] motion to dismiss/for summary
judgment, and was not raised in the complaint. . . . [Plaintiffs] claims must therefore be
restricted to the grounds set forth in the complaint." Id. at \ 31 (emphasis added). Again, the
Utah Supreme Court did not analyze or address whether the defendant had an opportunity to
engage in discovery related to the new claim raised for the first time or whether they had
adequate notice beyond the notice required in the complaint. Likewise, this Court should not
allow Plaintiffs to raise their new SB 189 claim when considering this motion for summary
judgment.
The Utah Court of Appeals in Harper v. Evans came to the same conclusion reached by
numerous Utah courts regarding Plaintiffs attempt to make new claims not raised in their
complaint. In Harper, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant "negligently performed the
November 2002 surgeries 'and nothing more.'" 2008 UT App 165, ^ 13, 185 P.3d 573 (quoting
Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, ^ 11 n.9, 984 P.2d 960). However, plaintiff attempted to raise a
new argument of defendant's negligent course of treatment after the surgeries. The court held
that "[t]hese allegations, standing alone, do not state a claim for relief for continuous negligent
treatment, even under Utah 's liberal notice pleading requirements." Harper, 2008 UT App 165,
f 13. The court further explained:
In so holding, we emphasize that we cannot rely on the allegations of a negligent
course of treatment raised for the first time in the Harpers' opposition to summary
judgment.... The Harpers were free to seek leave to amend their complaint to
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allege new or different causes of action, see Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), but having
failed to do so they could not effectively raise such new claims in their opposition
brief. See Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 38, ^ 31, 48 P.3d 895 (stating that in the
absence of proper amendment, "claims m u s t . . . be restricted to the grounds set
forth in the complaint").
Id. at H 14. Plaintiffs have not even sought to amend their complaint, presumably because Utah
case law would prohibit them from amending at this late stage in litigation, especially when trial
has been set and Defendant would be prejudiced by being required to file an answer to an
amended complaint, re-open discovery, and further delay resolution of this matter. In any event,
this Court should not consider any claims that have not been timely and properly raised.
b. The Utah Cases Plaintiffs Cite in Support of Their Claim of Compliance with
Utah's Notice Pleading Standard are Easily Distinguishable, and
Inapplicable.
In support of their claim of compliance with Utah's notice pleading standard, Plaintiffs
cite to Blackham v. A.M. Snelgrove for the proposition of "fair notice," and to Timm v. Dewsnup
for the proposition that the "pleadings are never more important than the case." However, each
of these cases is easily distinguishable and inapplicable to the present case.
In 1955, the Utah Supreme Court in Blackham dealt with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and held that the plaintiffs complaint
was sufficiently pled. 280 P.2d 453, 453, 455 (Utah 1955). However, a Rule 12(b)(6) standard
is completely different from the standard and issue in the present case. There, the plaintiff made
allegations of entitlement to money; defendant claimed that plaintiffs failure to allege that he
was the "owner" of the money merited dismissal. Id. at 453. The court concluded that plaintiff
had sufficiently pled entitlement to the money because "it [did] not appear to a certainty that
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plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support
of the claim." Id. at 455. This issue does not apply to the present case. Defendant has never
alleged that Plaintiffs' complaint was insufficient as a matter of law. Indeed, Plaintiffs have
successfully alleged Defendant's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b),
although now proven wrong. However, whether Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to
withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is completely different from the issue of whether they
have even raised a claim for purposes of summary judgment. The case law cited above refutes
their claim that they adequately and timely raised the SB 189 isstie.
Plaintiffs also cite to Timm v. Dewsnup, which also does not apply in this case.
Ironically, Plaintiffs have cited to a case that involves an appeal of a trial court's order
disallowing amendment of a complaint—something which Plaintiffs have failed to do altogether
and which is not even an issue in this summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs failed to provide the
entire quote from the court in Timm. This remainder of the quote reads as follows:
The pleadings are never more important than the case that is before the court. .. .
There can be no prejudice in this case because we'll give ample time for an
answer. . . . This is in harmony with what we regard as the correct policy: of
recognizing the desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely framed issues,
but also of permitting amendment where the interest of justice so requires, and the
adverse party is given a fair opportunity to meet it.
851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs have not even requested leave to
amend their complaint, and yet urge this Court to provide the same relief given to a party that
had properly and timely requested leave to amend.
In Wright v. Umv of Utah, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a similar claim for relief
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from a party who failed even to request leave to amend a complaint. The plaintiff in Wright filed
a complaint against a University of Utah employee, claiming he had "assaulted and struck" her.
876 P.2d 380, 381-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Later, plaintiff attempted to claim that the "assault"
may have been unintentional.1 Id. at 384. The plaintiff argued that her complaint should have
been "broadly construed" to allow a reading that the terms "assaulted and struck" could
encompass an unintentional act, "especially where the [defendant] was on notice from plaintiffs
response to its motion for judgment on the pleadings that she was attempting to assert an
unintentional hitting." Id. The court concluded that "[w]hile it is true that Utah has adopted
liberal notice pleadings requirements . . . those requirements cannot be applied in a vacuum"
Id. (emphasis added). The court went further:
Wright claims that even if we determine that her complaint alleges an assault, we
should nonetheless conclude that the trial court erred by failing to provide her the
opportunity to amend her complaint to allege an unintentional hitting. This claim
fails because Wright never attempted to amend her complaint, and instead stood
by her allegations as originally pleaded even in the face of potential dismissal.
Id. at 385 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have stood by their allegations and have refused to even
acknowledge that their Complaint fails to raise SB 189 as a claim, "even in the face of potential
dismissal." The cases cited by Plaintiffs fail to support their position of their compliance with
Utah's notice pleading standard. Furthermore, Utah appellate courts have considered their
arguments and have ruled against them on several occasions, including as recent as this year on
two separate occasions.

1

It is important to note that even though the Wright case dealt with a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the
sufficiency standard was arguably more difficult to prove as evidenced by the Blackham case addressed above, the
court still upheld dismissal of the claims and disallowed the plaintiff to pursue her unintentional tort claim
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CONCLUSION
This Court should not consider any of Plaintiffs' arguments or claims related to SB 189
in addressing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Numerous Utah appellate court
decisions prevent consideration of such unstated claims. Plaintiffs have relied on Utah's liberal
pleading standard as the basis for defeating summary judgment, since they have already
conceded that they cannot prevail in their claims as presently pled in their Complaint. Instead,
Plaintiffs now request that this Court rule that their claims of Defendant's alleged breach of
"Utah law" somehow satisfies their requirements under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled otherwise. In addition, Plaintiffs' failure to timely
and adequately request leave to amend their pleadings to conform to Utah's liberal pleading
standard contradicts the very case it used to support their claim of compliance. Therefore,
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for Summary Judgment and
refuse to consider Plaintiffs' claims related to SB 189, which they failed to raise in the
Complaint that governs and limits the scope of their claims.
DATED this O "~ day of December, 2008.
RICHARD B$&NDT MILLER NELSON

S. DA VIES
BELINDA A. MORGAN
RAPAEL A. SEMINARIO
Attorneys for Defendant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^*"
day of fajLCcvut falsi , 2008, to the
following:
David R. Olsen
John C. Hansen
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
36 South State Street, Suite 2400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0024
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

G \EDS1\DOCS\06016\2719\MS6826 DOC

12

